A Just city should favour justice and the just, hate tyranny and injustice, and give them both their just desserts.
Al-Fārābī, The Dictionary of Islam vol. IV
Al-Farabi, The Second Teacher
Al-Fārābī's image appears on the currency of the Republic of Kazakhstan
One of the most important philosophers in the history of Islam, Al-Fārābī (873-950), born in Wasij, near Farab (now Otrar), Turkestan where his parents had moved before his birth, spent most his life in Baghdad (Rescher 127) where the Abbasid dynasty had recently relocated the capital of the Muslim empire. As a philosopher, Al-Fārābī lived a poor life, much like an ascetic monk, in the Abbasid caliph capital of Baghdad; later, he left Baghdad and spent his final years at the famous court of Sī’ite Hāmdanid ruler Saifaddaula in Aleppo (Walzer 43). Al-Fārābī’s life ambition to adopt the Greek thought into the Islamic world led the late medieval expert in Islamic philosophy, Richard Walzer, to call him “one of the most attractive Islamic philosophers and perhaps the most attractive among them” (Walzer, “Aspects” 43). His studies of Aristotle and his treatises on logic and natural sciences have led followers of Al-Fārābī to call him The Second Teacher; however, his practices in the realm of politics more resemble Plato’s Republic and Laws.
During the 9th and 10th century, Baghdad was considered the center of Greek philosophy where believers of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam worked and studied together. In fact, Al-Fārābī studied under Christian philosopher Yuhanna Ben Hailan (Hammond) as well as Christian Aristotelian Abu Bishr Matta ibn Yunus from Syria Life ("Philosophers"). This tri-religious gathering worked smoothly, for a time, in the Islamic world specifically because “Islam is a faith set in the Judaeo-Christian mould, based on a sacred book, the Qur’ān, which is invested with a divine authority no product of the Greek tradition ever enjoyed and determines in virtue of this the belief and conduct of every Muslim” (Walzer, “Rise” 2).
Yet unlike his Islamic predecessor, the philosopher al-Kindi, who introduced philosophy to the court of Baghdad shortly before Al-Fārābī’s birth and believed philosophy should never attain predominance over “divine relation”, Al-Fārābī “represents an attitude diametrically opposed [to al-Kindi]; first and foremost a philosopher, he stresses the primacy of reason over the symbolic expressions of revealed religion” (Walzer, “Rise” 8). He fervently believed that Greek philosophy alone could help Islam reach its perfect destiny. He states:
Philosophy has come down to us from the Greeks, from Plato and Aristotle, both of whom have given us not merely the results of their meditations but also the processes which led to them and the way to revive philosophy whenever it has become deficient, or has fallen out of existence. (Walzer “Rise” 14-15)
He further states that he is the one who will revive it. Al-Fārābī planned to use the rising dominance of philosophy to restore the steady declining caliphate by reinterpreting Islam through philosophical terms (Walzer, “Aspects” 46).
Al-Fārābī’s plan involved reshaping the political organization of the Muslim world by incorporating the views of Plato, specifically, those of the philosopher king. He expressed his views in treatises like “On the Principles of the Views Held by the Inhabitants of the Perfect State.” Needless to say, this attitude did not go over well with the Christian faction in Baghdad; in fact, historic Christian leaders like St. Augustine specifically “distinguished between a ‘civitas temporalis’ and a ‘civitas caelestis’” (44). Neither did it seem to be widely accepted by the political rulers. The Abbasid caliphs, who initially supported the mingling of Greek philosophy and science with Islamic traditions during al-Kindi’s time, began to mistrust Greek philosophy, “identifying themselves with a strictly orthodox interpretation of Islam.” Eventually Al-Fārābī resorts to concealing his views regarding religious issues; however, he chose not to “express himself in allegorical or otherwise enigmatic language” (Walzer, “Rise” 14). In one of his last works on the ideal state, written during a steady decline of Abbasids, Al-Fārābī writes:
If at a given time it should happen that wisdom (i.e. philosophy) has no share in the government, though every other qualification for rule may be present, the idea state will remain rulerless, the actual head of the state will be no true king, and the state will head for destruction; and if no wise man is to be found and associated with the acting head of the state, then after a certain interval the state will undoubtedly perish. (Al-Fārābī, as quoted by Walzer, “Rise” 14)
Walzer argues that Al-Fārābī understood how to exploit the Greek tradition in order to “answer the crisis of the caliphate” during his time (“Aspects” 41).
Al-Fārābī contends with the stoics and Augustine that there are three theologies: the mythical, the legal, and the natural. These theologies were brought forward by: poets, legislators, and philosophers. The “mythical” he assigned to the Qur’ān for the legal aspects, which include the state religion and civil laws, Al-Fārābī substitutes Shari’a, “the divinely ordained Mohammedan law”—the “highway of divine commandments and instruction” for the Greek tradition (Walzer, “Rise” 17). The Qur’ān and the Shari’a convey truth in symbolic forms only, “according to the view derived from his Greek predecessors” (17), and this method of truth proves convenient for Al-Fārābī, who does not truly subscribe to literal resurrection of the dead, rewards and punishments after death, and transmigration. He believed that Muhammad intended these doctrines to be viewed symbolically so that ordinary man would be encouraged to improve his conduct (17). Neither man nor the universe can be considered in isolation. Once the philosopher-ruler, trained in the ways of Plato’s philosopher-king, gains power, he can, in effect, solve the problems of society (18).
According to Walzer, the following components are needed for Al-Fārābī’s good philosopher-king:
Al Farabi considered the city/state of democracy an “Ignorant city” specifically because each individual was given “unlimited freedom.” He believed that the basic need of some “ignorant states” was war in that only the strongest survived. Other states were ruled “ignorant” because of their desire for security, peace and the "establishment of an affluent society”; therefore, they were judged bad as well (52).
Walzer argues that:
It is proof of [Plato’s] lasting greatness that these ideas—like other views of his—turned out to be so suggestive and fruitful that they were able to live on in different historical circumstances, divorced from their native soil, and could be transferred to other civilizations and applied to larger political entities than the Greek city-states had been, to empires and to a universal world state. (“Aspects” 40)
In the area of natural sciences, Al-Fārābī follows the school of Aristotle. In his The Attainment of Happiness, Al-Fārābī tries to harmonize the two philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Yet this attempt presents him with two problems: First, opposition from the religionist sect, the theologians (Ahl al-Kalam), “who saw in philosophy a threat to fundamental Islamic tenets”; second, the fact that philosophy “as the true quest for wisdom” was steadily deteriorating (Fauzi 2). Al-Fārābī attempts to overcome these differences by asserting that “Plato’s use of the method of division and Aristotle’s use of the method of syllogism” harmonize with syllogism presupposing division (4). These differences are highlighted by Plato’s theory of form where ideas are the universals that form the content of our concepts. According to Al-Fārābī concepts are determined by definition:
[D]efinition declares what a thing is. Through definition concepts are so arranged and systematized that they imply one another until we arrive at the most universal ones, which do not presuppose others, such as Being, Necessary Being, Contingent Being. Such concepts are self-evident. A man's mind may be directed to them and his soul may be cognizant of them, but they cannot be demonstrated to him. Nor can they be explained by deriving them from what is known, since they are already clear in themselves, and that with the highest degree of certitude. (Al-Fārābī as quoted by Hammond)
Aristotle, on the other hand, does not accept the universal as a substance. He proposed that properties cannot be other than what they are, properties—substance is concrete (Najjar 4). These conflicting arguments by two great philosophers do not concern Al-Fārābī, who believes that they hold true in their “priority and primacy of the substances” (4). In addition to synthesizing their theories of form and substance, Al-Fārābī attempts to do the same with their ethics. While Plato’s ethics derive from basic transcendental forms of good ending with man’s freedom from the “shackles of the world” (as in the "Allegory of the Cave"), Aristotle’s ethics derive from “the nature of man itself” (Najjar 6). Still, Al-Fārābī argues, both assert that the main objective in life is happiness.
Al-Fārābī also conjectures that both philosophers supported a life of rewards and punishment after life. This contention is important in order to achieve the “successful introduction of Greek philosophy into Islamic culture” by convincing the Mulsim community that “Aristotle’s teaching on this question does not contradict fundamental Islamic tenets” (Najjar 7); but as already stated in this essay, these ideas most likely do not represent Al-Fārābī’s true opinions.
| Logic | Natural Sciences | Psychology | Metaphysics | Ethics | Politics |
| Introduction to Logic | Aristotle’s Physics | A commentary on Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De Anima | Substance, Time, Space, and Measure | A commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle | Political Regime |
| Abridgment of Logic | Meterology | Treatises of the Soul | The Gems of Wisdom | Encyclopedia (defines sciences and the arts) | Book of Principles |
| De Coelo et Mundo | Power of the Soul | A Letter in Reply to Certain Questions | On the Principles of the Views Held by the Inhabitants of the Perfect State | ||
| The Movement of the Heavenly Spheres | Unity and the One | The Sources of Questions | |||
| Intelligence and the Intelligible | The Knowledge of the Creator | ||||
| The Attainment of Happiness |
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